Case

Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.

Answer: Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (Mich. 1919). The court concluded that, in a traditional for‑profit corporation, directors may not withhold dividends merely to serve general public benefits; it ordered a special dividend but deferred to management’s expansion plans. Later treatments frame deference through the business judgment rule, and modern public‑benefit‑corporation statutes expressly authorize stakeholder balancing. ([law.cornell.edu](https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/business_judgment_rule))

Rule to remember

Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (Michigan Supreme Court, 1919) held that directors of a traditional for‑profit corporation may not forgo shareholder returns solely to pursue general benevolence; the court compelled a special dividend while declining to enjoin Ford’s long‑term expansion, illustrating both shareholder primacy and judicial deference to business policy.

Key elements and checks

In the source’s words

“The business judgment rule provides a director of a corporation immunity from liability when a plaintiff sues on grounds that the director violated the duty”

business judgment rule | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute

“Unlike traditional C corporations, which are primarily obligated to maximize shareholder value, PBCs are permitted, and required, to balance three considerations:”

public benefit corporation | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute

State variation matters. Dodge is a Michigan case and is often read as articulating shareholder primacy for traditional for‑profit firms. Many jurisdictions apply strong business‑judgment deference, and modern statutes authorize alternatives like public‑benefit corporations that permit balancing of stakeholders and public purposes.

Sources