#50 · 2026-09-25 · Case
Terry v. Ohio
Answer: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court held that an officer may briefly detain a person on reasonable suspicion based on specific, articulable facts and, with separate reasonable suspicion the person is armed and dangerous, conduct a carefully limited pat-down for weapons. The standard is objective and the frisk’s scope is strictly tied to officer safety, not evidence-gathering. See the opinion and LII Wex explanations.
Rule to remember
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), established the stop-and-frisk doctrine: an officer may briefly stop on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and, with separate reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous, perform a limited pat-down for weapons.
Key elements and checks
- Reasonable suspicion—more than a hunch, less than probable cause—permits a brief investigatory stop.
- The officer must rely on specific and articulable facts plus rational inferences.
- Objective test: would a reasonably prudent officer think the action appropriate?
- A frisk requires separate reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous.
- Scope: a carefully limited pat-down of outer clothing for weapons; not a full search for evidence.
- Evidence found is admissible if both the stop and frisk are reasonable.
In the source’s words
“the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts”
John W. TERRY, Petitioner, v. STATE OF OHIO. | Supreme Court | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
“Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.”
John W. TERRY, Petitioner, v. STATE OF OHIO. | Supreme Court | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
Meaningful variation: Some states have “stop-and-identify” statutes; the Supreme Court upheld Nevada’s in 2004 (Hiibel), but identification duties vary by jurisdiction. Traffic stops can provide the setting for this doctrine; always check controlling state law and constitutional provisions.